"adequately prepared to deal with" the "greater power, variability inherent in the export demand for QD = quantity of domestic use, U.S. farm products." In elaborating upon this QE = quantity of exports, concern, he reviews past and prospective growth PD = nominal domestic prices, and variability of exports and the implications PE = nominal export price, that they have for Southern agriculture. He conPx = nominal price of inputs, and cludes that variability is rising and will likely to X = quantity of inputs. continue to do so because of expanding exports.
The causes, consequences, and cures of instaThe three major policy implications that he bility obviously depend upon which term or draws are: (1) the inadequacy of present policies terms, variances and covariances, or time period to help farmers producing export crops accomare used to define instability in this equation. modate to the variability in cash receipts; (2) the One further needs to specify whether instability adverse effects that the variability in feed grain is to be measured in terms of the variable itself, exports may have on Southern poultry and liveits rate of change, or change in the rate of its stock producers; and, (3) fects of instability of export quantities. Economists have spent considerable time evaluating The bulk of Clayton's focus is upon variation the trade-offs between the mean vs. the variance of export tonnage, but he does not define instabilof income. Presumably, stability comes at some ity. He uses the following measures: (a) the incost. Some policies the government has used in terannual variability (standard errors) of foreign the past to cope with instability are: (1) trade demand (commercial exports?) measured in tons deterring farm programs and huge surpluses with of grain; and (b) the coefficient of variation and very stable, but subsidized exports (1960s); (2) the standard deviation of nominal domestic farm export embargoes to prevent domestic shortages prices, cash receipts, and income. There clearly (1970s); (3) embargoes or embargo threats to is a need to distinguish among: relative vs. absopunish Russia or Poland (1980s); (4) interpretation of the new farm bill is that the Secretary of Agriculture has broader discretional auClayton's premise is that exports are inherthority than before and that future embargoes ently unstable. I believe a strong case could be will be extensive and not selective. I only hope made for the converse. It is difficult for me to that this added discretion and future embargoes believe that the excess demand curve for U.S.
will be used to stabilize rather than to destabilize exports is more inelastic than the domestic deand to promote rather than to prevent U.S. agmand curve. In general, I believe foreign demand ricultural exports. to be more elastic than U.S. demand. Furthermore, the broader the market, the more elastic it becomes to any single country, thus, I see no IS THE MAJOR PROBLEM LIKELY TO BE reason why export markets are inherently more TOO VOLATILE EXPORTS?
unstable. Of course, government actions, as D. Gale Johnson has pointed out, may be such I am much less optimistic about export growth that they destabilize the market, or cause the than is Clayton. I believe the problem will be too elasticity of price transmission to diverge greatly slow rather than too fast export growth. Last from unity (Bredahl et al.) .
year at these same meetings, I argued that U.S. domestic grain demand in the 1980s would grow very slowly and that foreign demand would WHAT CAUSES THE INSTABILITY? slacken as well. I still believe that there is a distinct possibility of recurring grain surpluses. The Clayton spends little time discussing the projected record grain carryovers, the Secrecauses of instability: he deals mostly with its adtary's January 29 announcement of a 10 percent verse consequences. However, he indicates that feed grain and 15 percent wheat acreage reducthe U.S. is a "residual supplier," which appartion programs, and the 11 percent drop in exports ently causes the U.S. to suffer greater export so far this fiscal year suggest to me that grain variability than non-residual suppliers suffer. He shortages for Southern livestock and poultry does not present any evidence to support this producers is not the most pressing problem. contention, nor does he draw a multi-country I do not have sufficient information for critical supply-demand diagram and use it to define a evaluation of Clayton's concern about the deleteresidual supplier and contrast it with a nonrious effects of expanded exports on the South's residual supplier, natural resource base. He does not cite sufficient Clayton does not test whether crops with exdata nor give any references that would help me panding exports have significantly greater varibecome better informed. My impression is that ability than do those with stagnant exports, allittle is known about the physical extent or ecothough he implies that they do.
nomic significance of erosion and resource depleAs suggested by equation (1), there are many tion; I suspect there is little hard evidence linking factors that could contribute to increased export erosion to exports. variability: inflation, flexible exchange rates, I am most reluctant to suggest that the South more erratic weather, shift from governmentdisregard her comparative advantage, unless and assisted to commercial exports, decline in grain until we have more hard evidence on resource stocks, and fickle U.S. and Soviet government depletion and its causes and consequences. policies. Certainly, government is a major culprit. The U.S. has imposed five grain embargoes in the past decade and is currently threatening CONCLUSION another. Probably two-thirds of all grain trade involves government as either the buyer or seller Although my remarks have been critical and or both (Seevers) . Furthermore, agricultural nihilistic, I do not want to convey a totally negatrade has basically been sold down the river in tive impression of Clayton's paper. It certainly the international trade negotiations. The trade stimulated my thinking and raised a number of liberalizations negotiated during the Tokyo/ new questions. That, of course, is what an inGeneva Round represent less than 5 percent of vited paper should do. U.S. exports (Houck) .
I am more concerned about the prospect of the Contrary to Clayton, I do not see how export lack of export growth than the lack of export instability problems, which are to a great extent stability. I do not believe we have adequate meacaused by fickle and misguided government polisures of the sources of export instability nor the cies, "might be handled entirely within the priconnection, if any, of instability to export growth vate sector." I am not arguing that government and welfare. I do believe that export growth is should either take over or keep out of grain trade absolutely fundamental to the future of Southern completely. Rather I argue for more rational beagriculture and is a high priority research area.
